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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1  21st Century Cybersecurity 
There are few inventions whose impact on political, economic and social life is 
comparable to that of the Internet, as an increasing number of functions are 
conducted online. As the report Cybersecurity Policy Making at a Turning Point 
highlights: “Cybersecurity strategies recognize that the economy, society and 
governments now rely on the Internet for many essential functions and that cyber-
threats have been increasing and evolving at a fast pace” (OECD,9). Increased 
reliance on the Internet presents significant security challenges, as the more services 
that are conducted online, the greater the risks associated with cyber-attacks. This 
risk is intensified by cyberspace’s disregard for national borders allows cyber-threats 
to move rapidly across the globe and in that manner cause harm to civilians and 
governments (Green and Rossini, 4).  
Therefore, this thesis aims to develop a deeper understanding of cyberspace’s 
effects on global affairs, especially in regards to situations of interstate tension or 
conflict. Central to this study, is the question of how inter-state tensions and conflicts 
are being shaped by developments in cyberspace. In order to address this question, 
this thesis sets out to do as follows: 
1. Assess and evaluate the role of cyberspace in regards to the development of 
interstate tensions and conventional1 conflicts.  
2. Conduct a methodological (case study) analysis of three prominent cyber-
attacks: Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014-2015). 
3. Analyze the findings and develop conclusions relating to: the individual  case 
studies and to the greater geopolitical context.  
1.2  Limitations in the Research 
                                                          
1
 For the purpose of this thesis, the use of the term conventional war or conventional weapons refers 
to the traditional (non-cyber) understanding of warfare and weaponry.  
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While the role of cyberspace in international affairs presents many 
opportunities for research, there are a few limitations which need to be considered. 
First, as much of the information regarding cyber-attacks is classified by governments; 
therefore, the publicly accessible information represents a limited picture. This is 
especially important in regards to the discussion on cyber-espionage. Second, in 
regards to the case studies discussed, there is a limited number of primary sources 
available in English. Therefore, this analysis primarily relies rather heavily on 
secondary and tertiary sources, and only uses the official2 translations of primary 
sources.   
                                                          
2
 Provided by the governments themselves.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1  Introducing the Literature 
There are different opinions regarding how cyberspace affects interstate 
relations, especially in situations of political tension or conventional conflict. The 
literature is primarily divided into two distinct categories: those who argue that 
cyberspace promotes interstate competition, and that cyberwar3 will play a prominent 
role (cyber-pessimists) and those who reject this position (cyber-optimists). In general, 
the cyber-optimists believe cyberwar is unlikely and that it does not represent a 
paradigm shift for global politics.  
An especially contentious aspect of the literature is the discussion around the 
concept of cyberwarfare. This discussion is a central difference between the two 
camps. Overall, the cyber-pessimists’ position is in line with the realist tradition as 
they emphasize the anarchic nature of international relations which, they argue, has 
been expanded into cyberspace. Cyber-pessimists focus on the emergence of      
cyberwarfare, which, they argue, presents a threat to international security and 
stability. Meanwhile, the cyber-optimists recognize the dangers and challenges that 
cyberspace presents yet, they tend to downplay risks and reject the cyber-pessimist 
notion that cyberwar is occurring or bound to occur. These analysts approach the 
subject of cyberspace from a liberal or constructivist approach.   
2.2  Cyber-pessimist Literature 
Central to the cyber-pessimist position is the perception that cyber-conflict 
presents a risk for geopolitical security and stability. This perspective interprets 
cyberspace as a realm in which interstate competition is intensified, as states, driven 
by self-interest, may rely on cyber-weapons in order to attack their opponents, at a 
relatively low risk. Cyber-pessimists argue that the ability of states to use cyber-
weapons is emerging as a factor which is promoting the destabilization of the status 
quo, as it encourages the escalation of both interstate tensions and conflicts.  
                                                          
3 Also referred to as cyber-conflict, cyberwar, or cyberwarfare.  
  S1752189    
 
7 
A key component of the cyber-pessimist position is its focus on cyberwar as an 
emerging geopolitical challenge. Cyberwarfare is seen by the cyber-pessimists as the 
next major paradigm shift in the evolution of military affairs. As the report On Cyber 
Warfare describes the concept as : “…arguably at the most serious end of the 
spectrum of security challenges posed by – and within – cyberspace…” (Cornish, 
Paul, et.al, vii). The report reflects the cyber-pessimist’s central argument that 
cyberwarfare is emerging as a feature of global affairs as some of the largest and 
most damaging cyber-attacks have occurred within the context of tense relationships 
or conventional conflicts (Cornish, Paul, et.al). 
 Overall, the concept of cyberwarfare, is amply discussed in the                  
cyber-pessimist literature, especially in the works of: Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Clarke and 
Knake. In The Advent of Netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt maintain that: “network-based 
conflict and crime will become major phenomena in the decades ahead.” (Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt, Advent, 6). This understanding elaborates on their previous work, 
Cyberwar is Coming!, where they introduce the idea that advances in digital 
technology, represents a revolutionary change in how war is conducted (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, Cyberwar, 27). The authors argue that, beyond cyberspace, cyber-attacks 
can affect outcomes and have consequences in the real world (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
Advent, 11).  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s work highlights the notion that events in cyberspace 
such as cyber-attacks, impact interstate relations by promoting the continuation of 
tense situations or conflicts. This suggests the establishment of a paradigm in which 
actions in cyberspace -such as cyber-attacks- contribute to the destabilization and 
escalation of tensions. Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s arguments are echoed by Clarke and 
Knake, who interpret the emergence of cyber-attacks as a signal that cyberwar is 
emerging as a prominent feature of international conflict (Clarke and Knake). They 
primarily focus on the risk presented by the ability of some states to launch a cyber-
attack from almost anywhere in the world (Clarke and Knake, 38).They argue this 
creates an important challenge as cyber-attacks can be used to sabotage or destroy 
key infrastructure (Clarke and Knake, 38).  
  S1752189    
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Overall, the risks cyber-attacks pose to civilian infrastructure is a key concept 
which is vastly discussed in the cyber-pessimist literature, as it is also addressed by 
authors such as: Rosenzweig, Meeuwisse and Heickerö. In particular, these authors 
highlight past cyber-attacks, such as those on Estonia and Iran, as possible 
precursors for future attacks, that could resulted in the destruction or damage of key 
infrastructure. In general, the cyber-pessimists approach the subject of cybersecurity 
through a perspective which sees cyberspace as a realm in which states can use 
weapons in order to undermine each other, promoting greater geopolitical instability. 
2.3  Cyber-optimist Literature 
The cyber-optimist position can be interpreted as a reaction to the earlier 
cyber-pessimist literature. The cyber-optimist position downplays the risks of cyber-
attacks and rejects the cyber-pessimist posture that cyberwar is emerging as a 
feature of global politics. Hence, the cyber-optimists fundamentally disagree with the 
notion that cyberwar is bound to occur. Some cyber-optimists, like Gartzke, believe 
that the pessimists are overly focused on the risks associated with cyber-attacks 
(Gartzke). Gartzke suggests the actual likelihood of a dramatically damaging cyber-
attacks is rather low as, they are not as politically advantageous (for the attackers) as 
the cyber-pessimists suggest (Gartzke, 42). Though cyber-optimists acknowledge 
cyberwar to be technically possible, they do not perceive cyber-attacks as a politically 
attractive course of action for states to pursue (Gartzke, 42). Instead, cyber-optimists 
understand cyber-attacks as the new versions of traditional components of warfare, 
as such, they interpret cyber-attacks as: “…as the most recent phase in the ongoing 
revolution in military affairs”; rejecting the notion that cyberspace represents a 
dramatic shift which promotes greater geopolitical instability (Gartzke, 41).  
 A major proponent of the cyber-optimist perspective, Thomas Rid, centers 
much of Cyber War Will Not Take Place, on the rejection of the concept of 
cyberwarfare, which, he argues, has not occurred and that it will not in the future.(Rid, 
Cyber War, 5). Rid proposes that most of the mayor politically driven cyber-attacks 
actually represent sophisticated versions of three classical components of warfare: 
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subversion, sabotage and espionage (Rid, Cyber War, 6).Therefore, cyber-attacks 
are not really indicative of a paradigm shift, rather their introduction represents the 
adoption of new technologies to previously existing patterns (Rid, Cyber War, 6).  
 Sean Lawson builds upon Rid’s critique of the cyber-pessimist scholars’ focus 
on warfare arguing that the cyber-pessimists, particularly Arquilla, present an overly 
dramatic interpretation of cyber “doom” scenarios (Lawson, 301). Furthermore, 
Lawson introduces the argument that the situations presented by the cyber-
pessimists are not based on facts but rather, they are a reflection of: “… of long-held, 
but ultimately incorrect, assumptions and fears about the fragility and modern 
societies and infrastructure systems…”; which are not necessarily based on reality 
(Lawson, 300). This implies that, according to Lawson, the international system is 
much stronger than the cyber-pessimists contend and therefore, likely able to 
withstand changes in warfare, including the introduction of cyber-weapons (Lawson). 
Hence, many cyber-optimists, consider that cyberwar will only emerge within the 
context of conventional attacks and that, by themselves, cyber-attacks are unlikely to 
create lasting harm (Gartzke, 43). 
2.4  The Evolution of the Literature 
An interesting component of the cybersecurity literature is the interaction 
between the cyber-pessimists and the cyber-optimists. In this respect, the dialogue 
between Rid and Arquilla (who respond to each other’s critiques), provides insight to 
the contentious evolution of the literature. In his defense of Cyberwar is Coming!, 
Arquilla responds to Rid’s denial that cyberwar is possible by countering that it has 
already become a feature of international relations and, that the increased 
sophistication of the techniques and weapons used in cyber-attacks will radically shift 
how war is conducted in the future (Arquilla, 83). Arquilla argues that cyberwar 
constitutes an emerging modus operandi which exploits the vulnerabilities created by 
modernity’s reliance on the Internet (Arquilla, 83). In particular, Arquilla points to how, 
during Russo-Georgian conflict, the disruption of communications systems through 
cyberattacks, facilitated the advance of Russian forces (Arquilla, 83). Rid, responds 
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to this critique by countering that no cyber-attacks to date, even those which occurred 
during the Russo-Georgian conflict, by themselves meet the criteria necessary to 
constitute as acts of war (Rid, End).  
This dialogue suggests is the cyberspace literature, particularly in regards to 
cyberwar, is highly controversial and therefore, still evolving. Finally, while the 
optimist and the pessimistic perspectives have radically different stances regarding 
how cyberspace, particularly cyberwar, is changing global affairs, there are some 
important gaps in the literature. One area where there is a great potential for study is 
regarding cyberspace’s effects on interstate tensions and conflicts, especially in 
relation to how cyber-attacks are affecting the progression of events within these 
particular contexts.  
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Chapter 3 Cyber-Weapons and International Relations_ 
3.1  Defining Cyberwar 
There is significant debate, amongst cybersecurity scholars and experts, 
regarding the concept of cyberwar. Currently, there is no official (or generally 
accepted) definition regarding the existence of cyberwar (Klimburg,17). Yet, despite 
this debate, some scholars have attempted to define the concept. In their definition, 
Arquilla and Rondfeldt, describe cyberwar as 4  : “…conducting, and preparing to 
conduct, military operations according to information-related principles. It means 
disrupting if not destroying the information and communications systems…”(Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt, Cyberwar, 30). This definition provides an expansive understanding of 
cyberwar, as it involves any kind of cyber-attack aimed at damaging communication 
systems (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Cyberwar, 30). This expansive understanding of 
cyberwar is problematic; as it promotes a situation in which many cyber-attacks could 
actually be classified as cyberwar, regardless of whether their aims are political in 
nature. This could potentially promote a perception that cyberwar is a reality and that 
it is rather common. Furthermore, since there appears to be no clear indication that 
cyberwar is truly emerging as a factor on its own this analysis prefers to step away 
from the debate regarding the emergence of cyberwar and instead, focus on political 
cyber-attacks.  
3.2  Defining Cyber-attacks and Cyber-weapons 
There is also debate regarding the definitions of different cybersecurity 
concepts, particularly in regards to those related to the different kinds of cyber-
attacks and cyber weapons. Therefore, this section selects some key terms and 
adopts the definitions set forward by The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).5, 
These were selected as they provide clear, consistent, expansive, and balanced view 
on these concepts, which allows an open discussion of their application.  
                                                          
4
 Also referred to by some authors as cyberwarfare or netwar.  
5
 As described in the NATO terminology dictionary and other documents produced by the Alliance. 
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First, NATO defines a cyber-attack as: “Action taken to disrupt, deny, degrade 
or destroy information resident in a computer and/or computer network, or the 
computer and/or computer network itself.” (NATO, Cyber Definitions). This implies is 
that, from this perspective, a cyber-attack is not just an attack on the object itself 
(usually a computer) but, it is an attack on the entire network it is tied to and on the 
information which is managed through it (NATO, Cyber Definitions). This sort of view 
expansive is also reflected in the Alliance’s definition of a cyber-weapon which it 
argues that it is: “software, firmware or hardware designed or applied to cause 
damage through the cyber domain.” (NATO, Cyber Definitions). These definitions 
represent a manner in which to set the framework which permits the adaptation of 
these concepts to different political circumstances.  
There are many different kinds of cyber-weapons, varying in their degree of 
both effectiveness and technical difficulty. Some weapons, like Advanced Persistent 
Threat(s), are sophisticated and require high levels of technical expertise and vast 
resources to apply (NATO, Cyber Definitions). Usually, the objectives of APT(s) 
include the: “exfiltration information, undermining or impeding critical aspects of a 
mission, program, or organization; or positioning itself to carry out these objectives in 
the future.”(NATO, Cyber Definitions). Another important feature of political cyber-
attacks is the use of bots or botnets6, often for the purpose of conducting Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks (Czosseck, Klein, and Leder,108). DDoS attacks 
often really on bots in order to overwhelm their targets attacks (Czosseck, Klein, and 
Leder,108). A DDoS is a kind of cyber-attack where a computer, website or server is 
flooded with requests by many computers, causing it to either malfunction or shut 
down (Klimburg, 76). DDoS attacks are relatively basic and do not require advance 
levels of expertise, therefore, they are amongst the most frequent types of political 
cyber-attacks. Overall, these terms probably represent the most common types of 
threats facing states and the international system.7 
                                                          
6
 Bots are networks of computers which have been previously infected with malware that allows them 
to be controlled remotely (Czosseck, Klein, and Leder,108). 
7
 This will be discussed in the upcoming chapters.  
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3.3  Contextualizing Political Cyber-attacks 
While there are many different kinds of cyber-attacks, the most relevant for 
this analysis are politically driven attacks. Political cyber-attacks refer those that 
occur within the context of a major political event (including tensions or conflicts), and 
whose ultimate aim is political in nature. Because they are inherently tied to political 
events, it is important to analyze these attacks through the lenses of the greater 
geopolitical context in which they emerge. It should be noted that, while certain digital 
techniques can be used as weapons, they are not necessary weapons 8, as the 
intentions behind an attack may not be political in nature (Lewis, 41). This makes it 
difficult to determine whether a particular cyber-incident constitutes a political attack 
(Lewis, 41).  
As Stone notes in Cyber War Will Take Place!, it is difficult to determine 
whether a particular cyber-attacks constitutes an act of war, as most cyber-attacks 
lack the lethal violence associated with conventional attacks (Stone, 107). Thus, 
determining whether a cyber-attack is an acts of war requires a deeper analysis of 
the context in which it occurs (Stone, 107). Consequently, in order to determine 
whether a particular cyber-attack constitutes a political cyber-attack, it is necessary to 
establish some criteria. Taking this under consideration, this thesis relies upon Rid’s 
three types of interstate cyber-violence (sabotage, espionage and subversion) as a 
means by which to limit the scope of cyber-attacks which can be characterized as 
political (Rid, Cyber War, 15). These criteria provide a lenses by which to analyze the 
manner in which cyber-weapons are used within political contexts such as tensions 
or conflicts.  
Rid describes sabotage in cyberspace as: “…a deliberative attempt to weaken 
or destroy an economic or military system”(Rid, Cyber War, 16). While sabotage itself 
is not necessarily an act of war, it is often used as a means to “set the ground” for 
conventional forces, by crippling the opponents ability to respond to an attack (Rid, 
                                                          
8
 Some of the techniques and cyber-weapons used during political cyber-attacks can have other 
applications such as criminal activity.  
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Cyber War, 16). Therefore, in situations of conflict, cyber-sabotage can complement 
conventional forces by making it easier for the attacker to defeat its enemy by 
weakening key systems (Rid, Cyber War, 16). In tense relations, cyber-sabotage can 
also act as a preventive measure, by blocking a political opponent from gaining a 
particular advantage, such as a weapon. An example of this is evident was the 
filtering of the Stuxnet worm onto computers at the Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz, 
causing centrifuges to accelerate and self-destruct (O’Connell, 194).9 Beyond the 
delays Stuxnet created for the Iranian nuclear program, its lasting impact was that it 
demonstrated that a computer virus can be weaponized in order to take down a 
politically valuable target, (Cornish, et al.,7). Stuxnet demonstrated the potential of 
cyber-attacks being used to sabotage key infrastructure and create physical damage 
outside of cyberspace. 
Espionage represents another politically significant type of cyber-attack. While 
the Tallinn Manual defines cyber-espionage as the: “theft of intellectual property, and 
a wide variety of criminal activities in cyberspace”, it goes beyond that as it also 
involves the unpermitted access to any restricted or private information (Schmitt, 
17).In general, cyberspace generates an environment conducive to espionage as it 
permits the relatively easy access to vast amounts of information, frequently under 
the condition of anonymity (Klimburg, 16).  While espionage has historically been a 
feature of international relations, cyberspace adds a new dimension to the problem 
as it lowers the risk involved in trying to get access to a rival’s strategic information 
(Rid, Cyber War).  
Another important kind of political cyber-attack is a subversive attack, which is 
one whose purpose is to use the Internet (and other digital tools) in order undermine 
a particular authority (Rid, Real Cyberwar). Subversion is threatening as it seeks to 
undermine a particular actor’s or government’s legitimacy in order to spread a 
particular message. According to this thesis’ findings, subversive attacks constitute 
the most common type of political cyber-attacks as, they tend to be relatively easy to 
                                                          
9
 While no one has taken responsibility for this attack, many experts have concluded that Stuxnet was 
likely created by the United States and Israel (O’Connell, 194). 
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enact, as the technical skills require are relatively basic. As such, the real threat in 
regards these kind of attacks is that it promotes political instability. 
3. 4  Problem of Attribution 
The attribution of responsibility over an attack is an important challenge for 
any state’s cybersecurity apparatus (Klimburg, 67). Unlike conventional attacks 
where the perpetrator is often identifiable, an attacker in cyberspace can remain 
anonymous by using different technical means to disguise the true origins of an 
attack (Cornish, Paul, et al., 5). In Internet Governance in the Age of Cybersecurity, 
Knake identifies some key factors which complicate the attribution of attacks (Knake, 
13). Knake argues that since cyber-attacks, do not require geographical proximity 
between the attacker and the target, damaging cyber-attacks can be launched 
anywhere in the world (Knake, 13). Yet, despite the limits of trying to attribute attacks, 
a way in which the actor responsible can be identified10 is by looking at the larger 
political context in which an attack occurs (Wirtz, 30).Therefore, in order to avoid 
technical discussions regarding the attribution of attacks, this paper relies upon the 
political context surrounding in order to deal with the contentious issue of 
attribution.11 
  
                                                          
10
 While there are technical tracing mechanisms which could approximate the source of the attack, 
these will not be discussed as they are beyond the political scope of this thesis.  
11
 To be discussed in the upcoming chapters  
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Chapter 4 Case Studies Part I: Political Context 
4.1  Methodological Approach  
  In order to assess the question of how inter-state tensions and conflicts are 
shaped by developments in cyberspace, this thesis conducts an analysis of three 
case studies on the cyber-attacks against Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine. These three 
cases were selected as they represent examples of how cyber-attacks are affecting 
the progression of interstate tensions and conflicts. In order to analyze these cases, 
this thesis uses Rid’s three cyber-violence categories (sabotage, espionage and 
subversion) and investigates the extent to which each of these was present in each 
individual case study. In regards to the data contained in these studies, most of the 
information was collected from a wide array of works by different experts in the field. 
In order to further contextualize these attacks, this information will be complemented 
with an analysis of some primary sources.12 
4.2  Case 1: Estonia 
  The crisis began with the Estonian government’s decision to move a Soviet 
era memorial, sparking protests and riots among Estonia’s ethnic Russian population 
(Heickerö,131).These riots were accompanied by a series of cyber-attacks on 
important Estonian institutions (Heickerö,131). The cyber-attacks occurred in two 
main waves (Heickerö, 131). The first, beginning on April 28, 2007, was relatively 
simple and primarily conducted by hacktivists and included targets such as the 
Estonian Government’s Briefing Room and the Estonian Ministry of Defence 
(Heickerö, 131-132). These attacks were followed by a more sophisticated second 
wave of attacks, beginning on May 8, 2007 (Heickerö, 132). Significantly, this wave 
included attacks on some “mission critical” computers (such as those that dealing 
with telephone exchanges) (Heickerö, 132). This suggests that those behind the 
                                                          
12
 The methodological approach to these case studies continues in the next chapter.  
  S1752189    
 
17 
attacks had sophisticated information regarding what systems should be targeted 
(Heickerö, 132). 
  Overall, the second wave featured more sophisticated weapons, including the 
use of botnets to conduct DDoS attacks, and managed to bring down the websites of 
important institutions including: the Estonian Parliament, two of the country’s biggest 
banks, almost all of the country’s ministries and three of largest news organizations 
(Heickerö, 132). While the attacks on Estonia were restricted to cyberspace, they 
were still damaging as the country is one of the most technologically advanced, in 
which over 97% of all banking transactions are made online (Heickerö, 134). 
Therefore, even though the effects of the attacks were relatively limited, the Estonian 
government took the attacks seriously (O’Connell, 192). At the time, the country’s 
Defense Minister compared the attacks to the closing of the country’s ports, implying 
that the attacks carried the same level of seriousness as a naval blockade (O’Connell, 
192).     
  While in most cases DDoS attacks, such as the ones used in Estonia, are 
generally considered a “minor nuisance” the manner in which the bots were 
organized and the number of them involved13 suggests that those responsible had 
substantial resources to organize and conduct the attacks (Clarke and Knake, 14-16). 
This has led some analysts to conclude that the attacks were carried out by a well-
organized actor with ample resources, coordination capabilities and the technical 
know-how necessary to launch an attack (Heickerö, 133). This raised significant 
suspicions on the Russian intelligence apparatus, as the attacks emerged at a 
particularly tense point in the relationship between Tallinn and Moscow (Clarke and 
Knake, 14-16).  
Since its independence from the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1991, Estonia has 
had a complicated relationship with Russia, especially once Tallinn joined NATO and 
the EU (Herzog,50). This tense relationship has been complicated by the fact that 
                                                          
13
 According to some sources, over a million computers where engaged in flooding Estonian servers 
(Clarke and Knake, 14-16).  
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since independence, tensions between ethnic Russians living in Estonia and native 
Estonians have intensified (Clarke and Knake, 13-15). Therefore, when the statue 
honoring the Soviet forces was moved, ethnic Russians were outraged as they 
interpreted this action, as furthering their alienation from the general Estonian public 
(Clarke and Knake, 14-16). Furthermore, Moscow responded to the removal of the 
statue with an increase in a nationalist rhetoric towards Estonia and other parts of its 
periphery (Clarke and Knake, 13-15). Therefore, when the attacks emerged, many 
Estonian officers were quick to blame Moscow for the cyber-attacks, which Russia 
has denied (Herzog, 50).  
In a statement issued on May 1, 2007, the Estonian Foreign Minister 
described the attacks as: “The European Union is under attack, as Russia is 
attacking Estonia… the coordinated activities undertaken by against Estonia by 
Russia are a matter of the entire European Union.”(Estonian Foreign Ministry). This is 
significant as, not only does Tallinn place the blame on Russia for the cyber-attacks, 
it also, argues that it is an attack on the entire EU (Republic of Estonia). By framing 
the attack as an attack on the entire EU, Tallinn is implying that the cyber-attacks 
could happen to anyone and that there is a need for an European wide response to 
cyber threats (Republic of Estonia).  
In the aftermath of the attack, Estonian officials have looked to the West, 
particularly NATO, as a means to strengthen the country’s cyber-defence capabilities 
(Clarke and Knake, 13-15). In 2008, after pressure from Tallinn, the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established 14  in order to 
enhance cooperation and information sharing amongst NATO members, on matters 
pertaining to cyber-defence (Klimburg, About). The establishment of the centre sends 
several important messages. The first, is that NATO, after an attack on one of its own, 
considers cybersecurity to be vital issue and is willing to invest significant resources 
in building up its cyber-defence capabilities and infrastructure. Beyond reassuring 
Estonia, the establishment of the centre serves a political purpose as it demonstrates 
                                                          
14
 The Centre is headquartered in Tallinn.  
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Moscow that the Alliance is willing to step up its game on cybersecurity matters and 
that it is building up its capabilities to respond to future cyber-attacks.    
4.3  Case 2: Georgia 
Post-Soviet Georgia has had a complicated relationship with Moscow. In 
August 2008, Russia launched a war against Georgia, over the separatist, pro-
Russian Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Clarke and Knake, 14-
18).While Moscow claimed that they were protecting ethnic Russian populations 
living in these provinces, many analysts believe that the real purpose of the conflict 
was to weaken the pro-Western regime, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, and to prevent 
Tbilisi from advancing with its intentions to join NATO (Cohen, Hamilton, 1).  
Five days after the conflict began, a cease-fire agreement was brokered in 
which both parties agreed to a peacekeeping force; while the Russians agreed to 
withdraw from Georgia (Clarke and Knake, 15-16). However, that peacekeeping force 
never arrived, as a few weeks later, the provinces declared themselves independent 
and “invited” Russian forces to stay in the disputed territories (Clarke and Knake, 15-
16). Since then, the territories remain under the presence of Russian troops (Coffey). 
Meanwhile, Russia has continuously violated the peace agreement by refusing to 
allow international observers into the area while, also building up “puppet” 
governments in the regions (Coffey).  
The cyber-attacks on Georgia actually began about two months before the 
start of the military conflict (Heickerö, 135). Initial targets included: websites of 
several government ministries, Georgian financial and education institutions, and the 
defacement of President Saakashvili’s website (Heickerö, 136-138). Like in Estonia a 
year earlier, many of the attacks consisted of DDoS attacks in which botnets were 
instructed to target specific computers (Heickerö, 135-138). The attacks also included 
DDoS attacks against websites of: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Georgian 
Parliament, Georgian National (and other) banks and other institutions.(Rid, Cyber 
War, 81).  
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A key point is that, as Georgia connects to the Internet via Russia and Turkey, 
it was easy for the cyber-attackers to overwhelm and gain control of the routers 
transmitting information to Georgia (Clarke and Knake, 16-18). Consequently, 
Georgians lost control of the data flows to their country and, with it, the ability to 
access information (including news) from outside the country’s borders (Clarke and 
Knake, 16-18). Georgia even lost control over the use of its domain (.ge) (Clarke and 
Knake, 16-18). Many of the DDoS attacks were directed at Georgian media outlets 
and government websites but also directed at foreign news sites as access15 to both 
CNN and BBC was blocked (Clarke and Knake, 14-16). Seemingly, one of the main 
goals of these attacks was to prevent Georgians from accessing Western and 
Georgian information regarding the fighting in the separatist provinces (Clarke and 
Knake, 14-16). This all seems to imply, that these attacks clearly had a subversive 
intention, as they were meant to limit Tbilisi’s ability to gather support. This suggests 
that those responsible for the attacks had a clear interest in promoting a pro-Russian 
narrative and vision of the conflict.  
While, Georgia blamed Moscow for the attacks, once again, the evidence 
remains rather inconclusive (O’Connell, 193). Since many of the DDoS attacks where 
come from a variety of servers and had the support of volunteer hackers 16 the 
Russian government was able to claim that the attacks were the result of a public 
response and hence, out of their control (Clarke and Knake, 16). However, many 
Western analysts have concluded that the websites used to launch and promote the 
attacks had links to Russian intelligence as, the level of organization of the attacks 
suggests that the attackers had some sort of institutional support or coordination, 
most likely from the Russian government (Clarke and Knake, 15- 19).   
While some scholars, particularly Rid, have argued that the effects of the 
Georgian cyber-attacks were rather limited, as a only a few public services were 
affected, it still appears that the attacks played an important role in the conflict (Rid, 
Cyber War, 14). As Arquilla notes: “When Russian tanks rolled into Georgia in 2008, 
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 Within Georgia.  
16
 Many of them downloaded software from anti-Georgian websites (Clarke and Knake, 16). 
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their advance was greatly eased by cyber-attacks on Tbilisi's command, control, and 
communications systems, which were swiftly and nearly completely disrupted.” 
(Arquilla, Cyberwar).  Furthermore, the fact that the cyber-attacks intensified as the 
conventional conflict began, implies, that the cyber-attacks were in coordination with 
the military offensive on the ground (Heickerö, 138). This all seems to support the 
theory that, somehow, the Russian government was involved in the attacks. If this 
was really the case, the real impact of the Georgian cyber-attacks is that was a 
demonstration how Moscow appears to be experimenting with different ways in which 
cyber-operations can be used to complement conventional forces (Lewis, 45).  
4.4  Case 3: Ukraine 
The conflict began after Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, under 
pressure from Moscow, canceled the signing of an agreement which would have 
promoted greater economic integration with the EU (CFR). The decision sparked 
massive protests which escalated and became violent (CFR). This increased 
instability in the country and, in March 2014, Russian troops took control of Crimea, 
and after a controversial referendum, annexed Crimea to Russia (CFR). The 
annexation further heightened tensions in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk 
which pro-Russian separatists held an unsanctioned referendums resulting in these 
provinces declaring their independence from Ukraine (CFR). While Russia has 
formally denied its involvement in the crisis, there have been reports of Russian 
troops and military equipment in Eastern Ukraine (CFR). Since 2015, there have 
been several attempts to broker a cease-fire, especially since the signing of the 
Minsk Accords17, however, these have largely been unsuccessful (CFR). Since the 
start of the conflict, violence between Russian backed separatists and Ukrainian 
armed forces has killed over 9,000 people (CFR).   
Throughout the crisis, events on the ground have been accompanied by 
cyber-attacks including DDoS attacks and website defacements (Geers, 11). Some 
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 Signed in February 2015, the Minsk Agreements include provisions for ceasefire, restoration of 
disputed areas to Ukrainian control and withdrawal of heavy weaponry (CFR).  
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prominent cyber-attacks include: the hacking and leaking of sensitive information18 , 
attacks on the electronic devices of members of the Ukrainian parliament, attacks 
against Ukrainian media outlets, attacks against the Ukrainian Central Election 
Commission,19  among other attacks (Geers, 11). Another cyber-tactic which has 
emerged in the Ukranian context has been the organized dissemination of 
information through social media (Lange-Ionatamishvili and Svetoka, 108). As    
Lange-Ionatamishvili and Svetoka note: “The suspicious and seemingly targeted use 
of social media in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict offers considerable evidence that 
social media is being extensively used to support military actions on the 
ground.”(Lange-Ionatamishvili and Svetoka, 110). This has often been done in order 
to spread a particular message regarding the conflict, and manipulate the emotions of 
people in Eastern Ukraine (Lange-Ionatamishvili and Svetoka, 108).  
Perhaps the most significant cyber-attack was on December 23, 2015, when 
attackers disabled the control systems used in different electrical substations, 
resulting in a power outage which, lasted several hours and affected thousands of 
Ukrainians (Nakashima). This was the first known instance in which a power outage 
was caused by a cyber-attack (Nakashima). Beyond, its significance for the Ukrainian 
conflict, this attack represented an important shift as it resulted in a physical harm, 
rather than just subversive activities or espionage. This attack, represents the first 
instance in which, within the context of a conventional conflict, a cyber-attack was 
used in order to bring down key infrastructure.   
Overall, the use of cyber-weapons has been prevalent during the course of the 
Ukrainian conflict. However, cyber-weapons have been applied differently than in 
Georgia. Due to Ukraine’s wider connections to the Internet, it is impossible to block 
access to the whole country (Giles, 24). This would also not be very beneficial to 
Moscow’s interests as, through the ownership of telecommunications companies, 
infrastructures and networks, Russia already dominates Ukrainian cyberspace (Giles, 
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 This included conversations between Ukrainian and European officials. 
19
 These were aimed at undermining the credibility of the elections by presenting false results on the 
official election website. 
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24). Therefore, Russian intelligence services do not need to mount a great cyber-
offensive in order to access sensitive information as, much Ukrainian email traffic, 
including that of Ukrainian government officials, goes through Russian e-mail servers 
(Giles, 24). There has also been evidence of the presence of APT espionage tools in 
Ukraine (Geers, 11). These factors provide a possible explanation as to why, of all 
the three case studies, espionage has seemingly been more prevalent in Ukraine.  
In regards to the attribution of responsibility for these attacks, most experts 
conclude that the Russian government must have, to some extent, been involved in 
the attacks (Sakkov, 8-9). This claim is supported by the fact that these attacks have 
overwhelmingly benefited Russian interests vis-à-vis maintaining Ukraine under its 
orbit (Sakkov, 8-9). Many analysts perceive .Russian interests in Ukraine to be about 
Moscow’s attempts to maintain political control over what it perceives to be a key part 
of its sphere of influence. Thus, not only has this conflict been the longest of the 
cases analyzed but, is also the one where the use of cyber-weapons has also been 
the most prevalent. This implies that since Ukraine is such a strategically important 
point for Russia, Moscow is willing to go even further to prevent Ukraine from further 
integration with the West.   
Interestingly, the Kremlin’s actions in the country appear to have fuelled pro-
Western sentiments in Kiev. Currently, the website of the Ukrainian government20 
prominently features a section on the government’s aims to promote further 
integration with the EU (www.kmu.gov.ua). Furthermore, an analysis of the 
information which the Ukrainian government provides on its website reveals that 
despite (or perhaps as a result of) Russian intervention in the country, Kiev is 
increasingly looking to Western institutions, particularly NATO and the EU, in order to 
counteract Russian influence. For example, the Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers, contains several interesting points 
(www.kmu.gov.ua, Joint Statement). On this matter, the inclusion of the phrase: 
                                                          
20
 English version.  
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“Russia has a significant responsibility in this regard21; it must stop its continued and 
deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine through its political, military, and 
financial support for militants, withdraw its forces and military equipment from 
Ukrainian territory …” is indicative of the that Kiev is aware of Russia’s intentions in 
Ukraine, and is willing to take actions to counteract them (www.kmu.gov.ua, Joint 
Statement). Furthermore, the inclusion of the phrase “deliberate destabilization” is 
significant as the destabilization tactics have been evident in both the conventional 
battlefield as well as in cyberspace. Therefore, it is not surprising that Ukraine is 
willing to promote greater cooperation with NATO, including on the subject of cyber-
defence, as it may be a way in which Ukraine can seek to limit Russia’s destabilizing 
actions and thus continue to distance itself from Moscow’s influence 
(www.kmu.gov.ua, Joint Statement).  
This statement is significant as it stands in clear defiance of the Kremlin’s 
attempts to prevent Ukraine from further cooperation and integration with the West. 
This is significant as, as many analysts perceive the crisis in Ukraine to be a key is 
part of a wider confrontation between Russia and the West (Giles, 19). Furthermore, 
the fact that this is a joint statement with NATO, an entity which Russia considers to 
be a threat, suggests that Ukraine is acting in defiance of what Moscow wants, which 
could potentially contribute to the continuation of the conflict, both in the conventional 
world and in cyberspace. 
4.5  Understanding the Russian Role 
While it is certainly unclear whether Moscow has been behind these attacks, 
many experts have concluded that the Kremlin either conducted or, at the very 
minimum supported them.22 Therefore, in order to understand the political context 
behind these three case studies, it is important to analyze Russia’s defense policy. 
One way to analyze the Russian posture, towards these particular cases, is by 
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 Referring to the Minsk agreements.  
22
 In order to conduct an analysis of the impact of cyberspace on situations of tension or conflict, this 
thesis operates under the assumption that the Russian government had at least some responsibility 
for the cyber-attacks.  
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looking at The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. The National 
Security Concept, approved in 2000,23describes Moscow’s vision of the security 
threats facing Russia and its plans to cope with them (Russian Federation). The 
document is representative of a vision of the world in which Russia sees itself under 
threat from other states; as it argues that: “... number of states are stepping up efforts 
to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways….” (Russian 
Federation). Therefore, at the very center of its defense policy, is an understanding of 
geopolitics in which Russia sees the world, including the West, as representing a 
variety of threats, against which Russia needs to defend itself and its interests 
(Russian Federation). In this regard, Russia perceives the Eastern expansion of 
Western institutions, particularly NATO, as an existential threat, which Moscow sees 
as being aimed at weakening Russia, its power and its influence in the region (Giles, 
19). Additionally, the country interprets any Western “incursion” in its near abroad as 
a menace and is willing to respond with cyber and conventional force.  
 Furthermore, Russian policy towards its near abroad is also shaped by ideas 
about Russian culture and “Russianness” (Russian Federation). As the National 
Security Concept argues: “ ... The spiritual renewal of society is impossible without 
the preservation of the role of the Russian language as a factor of the spiritual unity 
of the peoples of multinational Russia and as the language of interstate 
communication between the peoples of the member states of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States….”(Russian Federation). This statement reflects the notion that 
Russia sees itself as the cultural and political leader of Eastern Europe(Russian 
Federation). Therefore, the adoption of Western values and institutions to its 
periphery represents a direct threat to Russian cultural and political dominance (Giles, 
19). As such, Russia comes to the “defense” of Russian enclaves, as it perceives 
them to be a way to maintain its influence in Estonia, Georgia and Ukraine.  
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 This strategy was selected as it was the one in place at the time of the attacks on Estonia and 
Georgia. While the attacks in Ukraine occurred under a later National Security concept, the general 
orientation and rhetoric used is similar.  
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 It is no coincidence that an underlying theme in all three cases was the 
distancing from Russian cultural and political dominance. In Estonia, the moving of 
the Soviet era statue was reflective of the country moving on from the Soviet 
experience, and implicitly, moving further away from the Russia’s regional dominance. 
In Georgia and Ukraine, the possibility of closer relationships between these 
countries and NATO/EU signified an important political loss for Moscow. Therefore, 
facing a situation in which Russia sees itself as losing influence in a strategic part of 
the world, the Kremlin perceives itself as being under an existential threat and thus, is 
determined to reassert its place in the world by demonstrating strength both in the 
cyber and conventional realms(Giles, 19).  
 Finally, in regards to the cyber realm, the National Security Concept 
states :“…The striving of a number of countries to dominate the global information 
space and oust Russia from the external and internal information market poses a 
serious danger, as do the elaboration by a number of states of a concept of 
information wars that envisages creation of means of dangerous influence on the 
information spheres of other countries of the world….” (Russian Federation). The fact 
that Russia perceives that other countries are trying to use cyberspace to “oust 
Russia” is reflective of the fact that Russia, in line with the cyber-pessimist 
perspective, as the country sees foreign dominance in cyberspace as a threat 
(Russian Federation). Thus, Moscow feels the need to reassert itself and its message 
not just physically but also in cyberspace. This idea provides an explanation as to 
why, in all three instances, a key aspect of the cyber-attacks involved the spreading 
of a pro-Russian narrative as, from the Russian perspective, the use of cyber-
weapons represents a valid use of propagandistic force.   
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Chapter 5 Case Studies Part II: Findings, Analysis and Conclusions 
5.1  Methodological Approach 
  In order to determine the extent to which each of the three types of attacks 
occurred in each individual case several research variables have been selected.24. 
These variables exemplify different ways in which sabotage, espionage and 
subversion can be manifested in the form of cyber-attacks. These variables were 
chosen based upon the fact that, according to the cybersecurity literature, they 
represent some of the most common types of politically driven cyber-attacks. The 
variables selected are as follows:  
Sabotage variables  
● Introduction of malware to key infrastructure systems (civilian or military) in 
order to cause, economic, political or social harm. 
● Disabling tactical/military means of communication (satellites, radar, GPS, 
etc.).  
● Using malware, DDoS, or other digital tactics in order to cause the failure of 
communications systems. 
● Cyber-attacks on key defense systems for the purpose of facilitating a 
conventional attack.  
● Disabling/destructing of a system for the purpose of preventing the acquisition 
of a particular weapon. 
Espionage variables  
● Targeted surveillance of leadership/key actors including the monitoring and 
interception of other digital communications. 
● Presence of advanced persistent (APT) espionage tools. 
● Theft of sensitive information. 
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 Five per category.  
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● Insertion of malware for the purpose of gathering information for a prolonged 
period of time. Extraction of military and security information for the purpose of 
preparing a conventional attack. 
Subversion variables  
● Defacement of official websites including (but not limited to) the websites of 
leadership and other important political figures. 
● DDoS attacks on government websites affecting ability of a government to so 
spread a message. 
● DDoS attacks that restrict the ability of a government, banks and other key 
institutions to provide services. 
● DDoS and other cyber-attacks on media sources(both foreign and domestic), 
in order to limit access to information.  
● Organized trolling, hacktivism and other digital tactics in order to spread false 
information/propaganda through social media. 
5.2  General Observations and Limitations in the Findings 
 In the process of selecting the cases for this thesis, there were several factors 
which need to be addressed, as they may have influenced the results. These 
primarily pertain to the fact that are significant similarities and differences between 
the three cases which may have played an important role in the development of 
these events.  
  In regards to the similarities, it is important to note that Estonia, Georgia and 
Ukraine are all located in the same geographical area of the world and therefore, 
they share many historical and political features. In that regard, all three states were 
formerly part the Soviet Union and gained their independence during the breakdown 
of the USSR. Yet, as a legacy of the Soviet era, all three contain significant ethnic 
Russian or Russian speaking populations, many of whom have not been well 
integrated with local populations. Furthermore, since independence these states 
have had a complex relationship with Moscow, which had, deteriorated during the 
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time of the cyber-attacks. Finally, in all three cases, experts suspect Russia was 
responsible for the attacks, something which Moscow has denied.   
  There are also a few important differences which need to be addressed. First, 
Estonia stands apart from the other two as it is a member of both NATO and the EU. 
Secondly, unlike, in Georgia and Ukraine, separatism is not really a feature in Estonia. 
These two factors could explain why the cyber-attacks in Estonia occurred within the 
context of tensions and were not accompanied by a conventional conflict. Another 
key difference is that while the attacks on Georgia and Estonia occurred within a 
narrow timeframe (2007-2008), the attacks on Ukraine occurred much later (2014-
2015). This has several implications, as technological advances regarding the 
development of cyber-weapons could provide an explanation as to why cyber-attacks 
have been more prevalent in Ukraine. Finally, considering how the conflict in Ukraine 
is still ongoing, it is difficult to assess what will be the final role of cyber-attacks in this 
particular context.  
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5. 3  Political Cyber-attacks (Table) 
 
5.4 Analysis of the Findings 
By analyzing these cases through Rid’s three criteria, several important 
features emerge, that have implications for these case studies as well as, for the 
wider international political context.  As displayed on table above, subversive types of 
attacks appear to be the most common kind of political cyber-attacks. A possible 
explanation for this is that subversive attacks provide several strategic advantages as 
they are technically simpler to enact, as they require relatively lower levels of 
expertise and resources. Yet, they can still have a significant impact as they have the 
potential to shape public opinion in the attacker’s favor. Secondly, since the aim of 
subversion is to undermine an rival/opponent’s core message, subversive cyber-
attacks provide a tactical advantage as they preventing a rival/opponent’s message 
from getting across. Therefore, it becomes easier for an attacker to get greater 
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“control” of the message being spread, often allowing the attacker in order to gain 
popular support for its position. 
 As these cases demonstrate, the propaganda aspect of cyber-weapons, 
particularly in regards to spreading a subversive message that serves the attacker’s 
interests, represents a very prevalent manner in which states are using cyber-
weapons in conflicts and tense relations. In these cases, the propaganda aspect of 
cyber-weapons, particularly in regards to spreading a subversive message that 
serves Russia’s interests by promoting a pro-Russian version of the events. 
On the other hand, espionage appears to be the least common type of cyber-
attack. Based upon the findings, it would appear that it was not a factor in either 
Estonia or Georgia, however, this is not necessarily the case. Because of its covert 
nature, the very aim of espionage is for the act to remain secret. Thus, since it is less 
likely that espionage will be made public, the information regarding instances of 
cyber-espionage is rather limited. Therefore, it is only possible to evaluate espionage 
in cases where the attacked state discovers and/or reveals that espionage has taken 
place. 
In regards to sabotage, it appears to be a constant feature of cyber-conflict, 
albeit a limited one. Because sabotage is usually more technically complex, and 
requires greater resources and technical expertise to enact. Therefore its presence 
as a cyber-attack has been rather limited. Yet, of all the kinds of attacks, cyber-
sabotage arguably has the largest potential for destruction, as an attack which 
damages or destroys infrastructure can potentially cause great physical harm. Hence, 
the attacks against Ukrainian electric infrastructure represent shift in the use of cyber-
weapons and may be indicative as to the direction in which cyber weapons are 
evolving towards being able to produce even greater physical harm. While in Ukraine 
the power was only shut down for a few hours, this does raise concerns that, under 
the right conditions, a cyber-attack against a critical infrastructure could produce 
fatalities. While at the moment this has not occurred, it is not entirely out of the realm 
of possibility. As many of the cyber-pessimists suggest, the ability to attack and 
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potentially destroy physical infrastructure could potentially become the next big 
evolution cyber-weaponry.  
By analyzing these findings, an interesting feature which emerges is that, from 
a chronological perspective, the number of cyber-attacks appears to be increasing. 
For example, out of the 15 criteria established in this study, Estonia only 
demonstrated 4 out of 15 variables, mostly in the subversive attack category. 
Therefore, the Estonian cyber-attacks represent the “lightest” of the three cyber-
attacks. Meanwhile, the attacks on Georgia demonstrated 7 out of 15 variables. 
While this represents a higher number of instances than Estonia, this is probably due 
to the political context instead of technological capabilities as it is unlikely that 
Russia’s cyber-capabilities would have dramatically increased within the span of a 
year. Finally, Ukrainian attacks demonstrated 10 out of the 15 variables suggesting, 
that these have been the most intense. While it is feasible that the prevalence of 
cyber-attacks in the Ukrainian conflict may be related to technological advances, it is 
likely that the political context, specifically the strategic importance that Ukraine holds 
for Russia, may have affected the amount of cyber-attacks. As Russia perceives that 
there is a greater risk in “loosing” Ukraine, it is likely to use more extensive means to 
maintain the country in its orbit, including more and more complex cyber-weapons.  
5.5.  Conclusions and Implications for International Relations 
  Beyond the effects on the case studies evaluated and discussed in this 
chapter also carry some implications for international relations as to of how 
cyberspace is shaping interstate tensions and conflicts. In particular, the findings 
suggest that beyond the technical capabilities of a particular state, the political 
context seems to be the determining factor in regards to the prevalence of cyber-
weapons. Despite this, it is also evident that cyber-weapons are technically improving 
and gaining greater potential to cause physical harm. Yet, at the moment, cyber-
weapons, are still primarily complementary weapons. 
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 As this thesis’ findings demonstrate the political context in which the attacks 
occur influence the extent to which cyber-weapons will be used. As Lewis argues in 
Compelling Opponents to Our Will : “Political context and alliance relationships have 
a powerful influence in constraining the use of force, including cyber-attacks.” (Lewis, 
47). The findings presented in this thesis regarding the prevalence of cyber-attacks in 
a particular situation of tension or conflict, indicate that political context will often be 
the determining factor as to the extent (and type) of cyber-weapons used. This was 
demonstrated by the case studies as, in the Estonian case, since the country belongs 
to both NATO the EU, it theoretically has political protection from a conventional 
attack. Since Moscow had little to gain and a lot to lose in a confrontation with 
Estonia and/or NATO, the Estonian cyber-attacks were meant to generate social and 
political pressure on Tallinn but, not really create lasting damage. On the other hand, 
in Georgia and Ukraine, Russia had a lot more to gain (especially in regards to 
control of territory) and therefore, it was more willing to conduct more damaging 
cyber-attacks.   
What this implies for a broader geopolitical context is that state self-interest, in 
particular that of the attacking state, may be the determining factor regarding the 
degree of seriousness of a particular cyber-attack(s). In cases in where a state has a 
lot to gain, it is more likely to use more advanced cyber-weapons. On the other hand, 
if a state perceives the risk of conventional conflict as too great, it will likely instead 
really upon “softer” cyber-weapons, such as subversive tactics, in order to make a 
political statement and to attempt to shape public opinion. Beyond technical 
advances, the differences between the attacks on Estonia and the attacks on Ukraine 
reveal that a state will be willing to use extensive cyber-weapons when it perceives 
vital interests to be at stake. Whereas, in situations in which the attacking state’s 
interest are not vital (and in which the risks involved are too high), a state may still 
launch cyber-weapons in order to create political pressure, but these will be primarily 
subversive and will, most likely not generate any long term damages.  
Secondly, these case studies seems to imply that cyber-attacks are getting 
more sophisticated. By analyzing these three attacks from a broad perspective, it is 
  S1752189    
 
34 
evident that there has been a progressive increase in the levels of complexity of 
political cyber-attacks. In regards to these cases studies, the implication seems to be 
that the Kremlin is working and improving upon its ability to launch cyber-attacks. 
This is significant as it means that Russia has found a way to incorporate cyber-
attacks into its long-term political strategy (Wirtz, 31). Furthermore, while at the 
moment cyber-weapons appear to primarily be “complementary weapons” to 
conventional conflicts, this may change in the future.  
This all suggests that the introduction of cyber-weapons and cyber-attacks to 
geopolitics is changing the development of interstate tensions and conflicts. While it 
does not appear to be the case that “cyberwar”, as described by the cyber-pessimists, 
is emerging as a factor on its own, it is evident that there an important shift going on. 
Therefore, one way in which one way this phenomenon could be interpreted as the 
emergence of cyberspace as the fifth domain25 of warfare, which is not a view that is 
universally accepted amongst cybersecurity scholars (Cornish, P. et al, vii). If 
cyberspace is emerging as the fifth domain, the implication is that states will most 
likely look to strengthen their cyber-capabilities (both in the offensive and in the 
defensive) in a similar manner in which they currently look to strengthen their 
conventional arsenals. However, if cyberspace is the “fifth domain” it most likely does 
not represent a dramatic paradigm shift, rather it is reflective of the natural evolution 
of warfare and weaponry. This is significant because, it implies that cyberspace will 
not produce the dramatic changes as the pessimists suggest. Instead, it appears that 
the traditional patterns of interstate interaction will continue to drive both inter-state 
tensions and conflicts. 
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 The four domains of warfare are: land, air, sea and space. 
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